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Sources of Inconsistency in Societal Responses 
to Health Risks 
By W. KiP VIscusI* 
Society responds in extreme and often in- 
consistent ways to health risks. In many 
instances, the pattern observed is one of 
overreaction. The Tylenol tampering inci- 
dents of the early 1980s drastically reduced 
the national sales of this product, even 
though the seven reported deaths were all in 
the Chicago area. Isolated terrorist incidents 
periodically choke off the consumer demand 
for European travel, and the Food and Drug 
Administration banned the sale of tens of 
millions of dollars of Chilean fruit based on 
evidence of low levels of cyanide injected 
into two grapes. More generally, there is 
evidence that individuals respond in an 
alarmist manner to increases in the risks 
they face, even though these increases may 
be rather small. 
Although one might be tempted to gener- 
alize from such events to conclude that there 
is always universal overreaction to risk, other 
patterns of behavior reflect errors of the 
opposite type. Individuals continue to fail to 
wear seatbelts as often as they should given 
the health benefits and the costs involved 
(see Richard Arnould and Henry Grabowski, 
1981). Similarly, society has until recently 
devoted insufficient attention to the long-run 
environmental problems that we face, in- 
cluding acid rain and the greenhouse effect. 
Our inaction with respect to these risks can 
hardly be characterized as a rational re- 
sponse or an overreaction to risk. 
There are three possible explanations of 
such diverse phenomena. First, one could 
simply dismiss this behavior as being the 
result of inconsistent and irrational behav- 
ior. Second, one could device ad hoc expla- 
nations of why individuals underreact in 
some instances and overreact in others. A 
third possibility is to reconcile this seemingly 
inconsistent behavior with a consistent theo- 
retical framework. In this paper, I follow the 
third approach in which I discuss new results 
that indicate how the character of individual 
risk perceptions can generate inconsistent 
patterns of response. 
I. The Pattern of Risk Perceptions 
The genesis of my approach stems from 
the relationship between perceived and ac- 
tual risks. Figure 1 sketches the relationship 
that has been borne out in studies of risk 
perception. At probability levels below Fo, 
individuals tend to overestimate the risk 
level, whereas for large risks above Fo, there 
is a tendency toward underestimation. Indi- 
viduals consequently exaggerate the risks 
posed by rare events, such as the chance of 
being hit by lightning, and underassess the 
truly major risks, such as the chance of death 
by heart attack or stroke. In addition, the 
discontinuity of preferences at the zero-risk 
level indicates that there will be a substantial 
jump in the perceived risk level once the risk 
rises from being zero to some nonzero level 
of risk. 
I have incorporated this basic pattern of 
risk perception within a general theory of 
decision making under uncertainty, which I 
have termed "prospective reference theory" 
(see my 1989 paper). The principal modifi- 
cation in standard choice models is that one 
replaces the individual's actual probability q 
with some perceived probability rr(q). For 
example, using a beta probability distribu- 
tion, if q is the risk of an accident, then we 
can write rr(q) = (ap + Sq)/(a + 8), where 
p denotes the reference risk level, q denotes 
the risk associated with the particular event, 
a is the informational content associated 
with p, and 8 is the informational content 
associated with q. 
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FIGURE~ 1. RELATION BETWEEN STATED AND 
PERCEIVED PROBABILITIES. 
This formulation is consistent with a 
Bayesian learning model in which the refer- 
ence risk p corresponds to the decision 
maker's prior probability assessment. In the 
context of accidental death risks, this proba- 
bility could, for example, be the average risk 
being addressed in the survey. In the context 
of laboratory experiments, the probability 
associated with the lottery outcome could be 
the probability that would prevail if the re- 
spondent did not take the experiment de- 
scription as being fully informative, but in- 
stead placed some weight on a prior in which 
all outcomes in a lottery were equally likely. 
Application of this approach to the 
anomalies that have been observed in the 
literature produces quite powerful results. 
One can reconcile a large and diverse array 
of types of irrational behavior with the stan- 
dard expected utility model upon making 
this transformation. Moreover, what is most 
stniking is that this formulation predicts such 
behavior as opposed to being potentially 
consistent with these anomalies. For exam- 
ple, the methodology predicts that the Allais 
Paradox will prevail, that there will be a 
certainty effect in which individuals value 
risk reductions that achieve complete cer- 
tainty more greatly than they should, and 
many other prominent violations of the stan- 
dard expected utility theory. 
II. Implications for Risk-Taking Behavior 
Consider a binary lottery situation in 
which an individual faces a probability q of 
injury or death and a probability of 1- q 
of remaining healthy, where the perceived 
probability is given by r(q). In the good 
health state, utility is given by U(I), and in 
the ill health state, utility is given by V(I - 
L), where I is the income level and L is a 
monetary loss (possibly 0) associated with ill 
health. For any given level of income, the 
individual is assumed to rather be healthy 
than not and to be risk averse. I will also 
assume that the marginal utility of income is 
at least as great when healthy as when one is 
not, which has been borne out empirically in 
the case of job risks (see my paper with 
William Evans, 1990). 
Let Y be the compensation such as a price 
cut for a risky product, or a wage premium 
for a hazardous job that is necessary to 
maintain the individual's expected utility 
level at UO, or 
(1) UO=(1- (q))U(I+Y) 
+ -(q) V(I+ Y-L). 
The first tradeoff that will be considered is 
how the required compensation Y varies with 
the extent of the loss. Total differentiation of 
equation (1) yields the result that 
dY __q__ ___V _ > (2) -= X 0.)V 
dL (1-7T(q))U'+ ?'(q)V' 
As the loss increases, the required com- 
pensation Y rises. The more important issue 
is the extent to which dY/dL is altered by 
the introduction of perceptional biases. For 
situations in Figure 1 in which q is below Fo, 
r(q) will exceed q, implying that dY/dL 
will be increased by the biases in risk per- 
ception for small risks. Similarly, the re- 
quired compensation will be decreased by 
the perceptional biases for high risk levels. 
The analogous result for the effect of 
changes in the risk level q are somewhat 
more complex, and it is more instructive to 
consider them within the context of concrete 
economic actions that will alter the risk level. 
In particular, suppose that we have opportu- 
nities both for insurance and self-protection. 
In the case of self-protection, one can take a 
precautionary expenditure c that will influ- 
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ence the risk component q, but the reference 
risk component p will be unaffected so that 
we have ?T(q(c)) = (ap + Sq(c))/(a + 8). In 
addition, one can choose to purchase an 
amount of insurance x for a unit price of s, 
leading to the optimization problem 
(3) MaxZ=(1-7T)U(I-sx-c) 
C, x 
+ 7,V(I- L - sx + x - c). 
The condition for optimal insurance is 
given by 
(4) U'= (,lq) ((I -s)1(1 - T)) P. 
Consider the actuarially fair insurance 
case, where s = q. For 7T(q) > q, the right- 
hand side of equation (4) will be larger than 
in the unbiased case, implying that a lower 
marginal utility of income in state 2 is needed 
to establish the optimal insurance amount. A 
lower marginal utility of income is associ- 
ated with a higher level of insurance, so that 
for the risk levels below Fo in Figure 1, there 
will be an incentive to overinsure as com- 
pared with the unbiased case. For the points 
above Fo, there will be an incentive to under- 
insure. 
Risk perception biases have a more com- 
plex effect on safety precautions. The re- 
quirement for optimal self-protection is that 
(5) - dq/dc 
a + [(1- T(q)) U+ g(q) V ] 
8 (U- V) 
The value - dq/dc indicates the marginal 
productivity of precautionary behavior in in- 
fluencing the risk level. 
The requirement on the marginal produc- 
tivity of safety precautions as reflected in the 
right-hand side of equation (5) is affected 
in two ways by perceptional biases. The in- 
formational content term (a + 8)/S, that 
exceeds 1.0, induces a lower level of precau- 
tions by requiring a higher marginal produc- 
tivity - dq/dc. In situations of optimal in- 
surance (U'= V'), the net effect will be to 
diminish the level of precautions selected. 
When there is not full insurance, the results 
become more ambiguous because the effect 
of the risk perception biases on the level of 
insurance and the expected marginal utility 
of income hinge on how much marginal util- 
ities are altered when one departs from the 
optimal insurance amount, and on whether 
the size of any such effect outweighs the role 
of the informational weight term. If, how- 
ever, the dominant effect is that the biases in 
risk perceptions raise the required marginal 
productivity of safety expenditures, as in the 
optimal insurance case, then risk perception 
biases will always reduce precautionary ex- 
penditures. 
The nature of the different influences can 
be summarized using Figure 1. Overall atti- 
tudes toward risk and the desirability of 
insurance will be governed by the relation- 
ship between the perceived and actual prob- 
abilities. For q < Fo, risks are overestimated, 
and there will be a tendency to overinsure 
and to be overly cautious in discrete re- 
sponses to risk. For large risks, q > Fo, the 
reaction will be the opposite. From the 
standpoint of continuous choices affecting 
safety, however, what is primarily relevant is 
the slope of CD, not the level of the prob- 
ability, although this continues to enter 
the expected marginal utility. Since the per- 
ception function r(q) flattens out the re- 
lationship between perceived and actual 
probabilities, the marginal efficacy of safety 
expenditures is reduced. A precaution that 
reduces a risk from Bo to Ao in Figure 1 has 
a more modest effect of reducing the per- 
ceived risk from B1 to Al. The risk percep- 
tion function consequently mutes the per- 
ceived impact that safety precautions will 
have for all levels of risk. 
These different competing effects indicate 
why one might have quite conflicting reac- 
tions to the same level of risk. Why, for 
example, do we respond in often alarmist 
ways to the various low probability health 
risks that are called to our attention, yet we 
fail to take appropriate safety precautions, 
such as seatbelt use, that are available to us? 
Although a variety of explanations are pos- 
sible, the character of the risk perception 
biases, alone is sufficient to explain these 
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seemingly contradictory phenomena. The le- 
vel of the risk may be overestimated, but 
the risk perception function may also serve 
to dampen the perceived efficacy of safety 
precautions, so that when we have available 
actions offering incremental reductions in 
risk, we underrespond. 
Although this conclusion is true for 
marginal changes in riskiness, if there are 
available strategies that will completely elim- 
inate the risk, then there will be no such 
dampening in the response. In particular, if 
we can reduce the risk to zero, we not only 
obtain a value of the marginal perceived risk 
reduction probability along CD, but we also 
achieve the additional bonus in terms of the 
perceived risk reduction of OC. Thus, there 
will be a predilection for policies that achieve 
the complete certainty of risk reduction. This 
predilection is borne out in studies of con- 
sumer evaluation of product safety, as con- 
sumers are willing to pay much more for the 
final incremental reduction in risk to zero 
than they are for the earlier risk reductions 
of equal magnitude, even though economic 
theory would predict the opposite. Stringent 
government regulations, such as the Delaney 
Clause's requirement that no nonzero car- 
cinogenic food additives be permitted, is 
likewise consistent with this orientation. 
The character of the bias is dependent on 
the nature of the risky decision. Individuals 
tend to overreact to identified increases in 
the risk level from its accustomed amount. 
The study of consumer valuation of product 
safety by myself with Wesley Magat, and 
Joel Huber (1987), found that individuals 
were willing to pay moderate amounts for 
product risk reductions of 15 injuries per 
10,000 bottles of insecticide or toilet bowl 
cleaner used per year, but when faced with a 
product risk increase of 1/10,000 most con- 
sumers were unwilling to buy the product at 
all, and those that were demanded a consid- 
erable price discount. In this context, the 
risky choice focused on changes in the risk 
from the current risk reference point to which 
consumers had become accustomed. In the 
case in which consumers are focusing on the 
risk increase of a product, the jump in the 
perceived probability indicated by the seg- 
ment OC in Figure 1 is the pertinent per- 
ceived risk increase from a marginal shift in 
the product risk. Even if there were a risk 
decrease of similar magnitude to the risk 
increase, there would be no reason to believe 
that consumers would respond in symmetric 
fashion, because the reference risk probabil- 
ity p that individuals have with respect to 
the risks posed by product improvements as 
opposed to deteriorations in product quality 
may be quite different. 
III. Discounting Deferred Effects 
The decision problems that individuals 
face involving risk are compounded by the 
task of appropriately discounting these out- 
comes. Although it has long been speculated 
that individuals behave myopically, there is 
no systematic evidence that this is the case. 
Studies of worker valuations of death risks 
(such as my paper with Michael Moore, 1989) 
indicate that the implicit rates of interest 
with which workers discount the years of life 
at risk on the job are consistent with rational 
behavior. Our point estimates of the implied 
discount rates are in the vicinity of 11 per- 
cent, which is somewhat high, but the stan- 
dard errors on these estimates are sufficient 
to include other market reference points, 
such as prevailing mortgage interest rates. 
In many respects, examining revealed 
preferences toward risks to their welfare at 
different periods of time may represent a 
best-case scenario. A more important issue 
from the standpoint of policy is how we will 
address effects that will not simply influence 
our own well-being, but also that of our 
children and future generations. The U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget (1988) 
has long specified a 10 percent rate of dis- 
count as the main reference point for such 
calculations-an approach that will drasti- 
cally reduce the attractiveness of policies 
such as those that reduce cancer risks, or 
have long-term implications for our ecologi- 
cal well-being. 
Although there have been a variety of 
battles over the appropriate discount rate, 
insufficient attention has been paid to the 
implications of the productivity assumptions 
that underlie 'such discount rate estimates. In 
particular, if the appropriate rate of discount 
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is in fact 10 percent, then the rate of ex- 
pected productivity growth in the economy 
also must be quite substantial to justify such 
a high rate. This growth will boost the in- 
come of future generations, which in turn 
will raise the value that they attach to the 
risk reduction benefits. Recent estimates by 
myself and Evans (1990) indicate that the 
elasticity of the implicit value of job injuries 
with respect to income is 1.0, and if this 
relationship generalizes to other health im- 
pacts, then it implies that an increase in 
income will increase the risk reduction bene- 
fit values proportionally. Valuing health risks 
through use of high discount rates should 
not drastically affect the attractiveness of 
policies with long-term implications, pro- 
vided that the benefit values are adjusted 
appropriately. 
Perhaps the main shortcoming is that indi- 
viduals are likely to place an inefficiently low 
weight on benefits to future generations. 
Moreover, our social institutions have thus 
far proven to be very poor at long range 
planning, as there is a predilection for re- 
sponding to more imminent crises. Indeed, if 
it had not been for the hot summer of 1988, 
it is unlikely that addressing the greenhouse 
effect would even be on our national agenda. 
As in the case of risk perception biases, 
the most disturbing aspect of these potential 
market failures is that the government poli- 
cies intended to eliminate the shortcomings 
often appear to be driven by the same set of 
influences. 
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